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Abstract
Elizabeth Anscombe criticizes Ludwig Wittgenstein for talking about the “natural expres-
sion of an intention” in his Philosophical Investigations. I consider recent responses to this 
dispute, especially those by Richard Moran and Martin Stone (writing together) and by 
Martin Gustafsson. Moran and Stone explain why Anscombe rejects talk of non-human 
animals expressing intention, but emphasize the importance of language so much that 
it becomes hard to see on what basis intentions can ever be non-arbitrarily attributed to 
animals. Gustafsson notices this problem, and offers a solution based on biology and, 
in particular, knowledge of what is and is not conducive to the flourishing of members 
of each species. However, this goes beyond what Anscombe says, and introduces other 
problems. I propose that we can sometimes simply see what an individual intends to do 
by observing its behavior, without reference to what is good or bad for members of its 
species. This is true to what Anscombe says and appears to avoid the problems faced by 
the other views considered. 
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Resum. «Guaita, l’està mirant fixament»: Anscombe i Wittgenstein sobre animals i intenció 
Elizabeth Anscombe critica Ludwig Wittgenstein perquè parla de l’«expressió natural 
d’una intenció» en les seves Investigacions filosòfiques. Considero unes respostes recents 
a aquesta disputa, especialment les de Richard Moran i Martin Stone (com a coautors) 
i de Martin Gustafsson. Moran i Stone expliquen per què Anscombe rebutja parlar de 
la intenció d’expressió dels animals no humans, però emfatitzen tant la importància del 
llenguatge que resulta difícil de veure sobre quina base les intencions poden atribuir-se 
no arbitràriament als animals. Gustafsson se n’adona i ofereix una solució basada en la 
biologia i, en particular, en el coneixement del que és i no és propici perquè prosperin els 
membres de cada espècie. Tanmateix, això va més enllà del que diu Anscombe i introdueix 
altres problemes. A vegades podem veure el que un individu pensa fer simplement obser-
vant el seu comportament, sense fer referència al que és bo o dolent per als membres de 
la seva espècie. Això és fidel a les paraules d’Anscombe i sembla evitar els problemes que 
afronten els altres punts de vista considerats.  
Paraules clau: Anscombe; Wittgenstein; animals; intenció; expressió; comportament
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Elizabeth Anscombe famously criticizes her teacher Ludwig Wittgenstein for 
talking about the “natural expression of an intention” (Anscombe, 2000: 5) 
in Philosophical Investigations (Wittgenstein, 2009: §647). I will consider 
recent responses to this dispute by Mikel Burley, Richard Moran and Martin 
Stone, and Martin Gustafsson. Burley’s response, I will argue, is incomplete. 
A fuller understanding of the issue can be gained by learning from both Moran 
and Stone and from Gustafsson, who disagrees with them. The two papers by 
these three authors are very largely correct, but each contains a significant flaw. 
Anscombe is less concerned about defending Aristotelian or Thomist meta-
physics than Gustafsson takes her to be, while Moran and Stone are wrong to 
argue that intentions must be verbalized in order to be judged correct or 
incorrect. More positively, I argue that Anscombe’s criticism of Wittgenstein 
is correct and, more importantly, that understanding both why this is and 
exactly what she is, and is not, saying helps us understand the concept of 
intention. Like Wittgenstein’s work, Anscombe’s can be rather compressed, 
and working through the details implicit in it, details which are brought out 
very carefully by Moran and Stone and by Gustafsson, gives a fuller and clear-
er view of the concept of intention.
In order to decide whether Anscombe’s criticism of Wittgenstein is correct 
we should first consider the evidence. Wittgenstein asks: “What is the natural 
expression [Ausdruck] of an intention? – Look at a cat when it stalks a bird; or 
a beast when it wants to escape” (Wittgenstein, 2009: §647). In his remarks 
before this passage, Wittgenstein was considering the idea of intention as an 
inner experience or sensation, and he does not appear to think much of this 
idea. Instead of looking narrowly in order to find the particular thing that an 
intention might be, Wittgenstein wants to look more widely at the context in 
which one acts with a certain intention. In §643 he writes that, “If I now 
become ashamed of [an] incident, I am ashamed of the whole thing: of the 
words, of the poisonous tone, and so on.” In the following section, in response 
to a claim that I might be ashamed not of what I did but of the intention with 
which I did it, he asks, “And didn’t the intention lie also in what I did? What 
justifies the shame? The whole background of the incident.” So he is drawing 
our attention, repeatedly, to “the whole thing” and the “whole background.” 
In §647 itself, after the remark that Anscombe criticizes, he adds, “(Connec-
tion with propositions about sensations.)” Wittgenstein does not deny that 
sensations exist or that they are particular things (although he might regard 
that way of putting the point across as potentially misleading), but he does 
think that if we want to understand propositions about sensations then we 
ought to examine the role of such propositions in our lives, including the way 
we learn to use and respond to them. Famously, he points out that inner pro-
cesses need to have outward criteria if we are to be able to talk about them (see 
Wittgenstein, 2009: §580). This might apply to intentions just as much as it 
does to sensations. So generally speaking, Wittgenstein diverts attention away 
from a narrow focus on intentions themselves, as if they were inner objects of 
some kind that we might understand better if we were to scrutinize them more 
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closely, and instead encourages us to look more at the wider context in which 
we talk about intentions and the background against which we do so.
Responding to the first, non-parenthetical part of §647, Anscombe writes: 
Intention appears to be something that we can express, but which brutes 
(which, e.g. do not give orders) can have, though lacking any distinct expres-
sion of intention. For a cat’s movements in stalking a bird are hardly to be 
called an expression of intention. One might as well call a car’s stalling the 
expression of its being about to stop. Intention is unlike emotion in this 
respect, that the expression of it is purely conventional; we might say ‘linguis-
tic’, if we will allow certain bodily movements with a conventional meaning 
to be included in language. Wittgenstein seems to me to have gone wrong in 
speaking of the ‘natural expression of an intention’ (Philosophical Investigations 
§647). (Anscombe, 2000: 5) 
Wittgenstein refers at different times to the natural expression of sensation 
and the natural expression of intention. This, like the parenthetical remark 
in §647, might suggest a similarity between sensation and intention that 
Anscombe wants to deny. Wittgenstein’s §647 is reminiscent of Investigations 
§256, where he asks: “But suppose I didn’t have any natural expression 
[Äußerungen] of sensation, but only had sensations?” The word for expres-
sions here suggests linguistic expression, which is what Anscombe seems to 
have in mind, but the qualifying adjective ‘natural’ suggests that Wittgenstein 
is not talking about anything merely conventional. In §257 he talks about 
groans and grimaces as manifestations of pain. Presumably this is the kind of 
thing he has in mind in §256 when he refers to natural expressions of sensa-
tion. He uses a different word for expression in §647, and indeed the move-
ments of a stalking cat seem further from language proper than a groan of 
pain. But it still seems right to say that these movements show something 
about what the cat is up to, something that will help us to predict and under-
stand its movements. Why not call this an expression of intention?
Burley’s view is that the disagreement between Wittgenstein and Ans-
combe is due to an ambiguity in the word ‘expression’ (Burley, 2012: 170). 
His point is that a cat cannot voluntarily reveal its intention. However, it might 
nevertheless, non-voluntarily, exhibit or display its intention. This seems right, 
but Anscombe does not deny it. Her claim is that unlike emotion (and, I would 
think, a sensation such as pain), intention has only conventional, not natural, 
expression. In order to see why Burley’s plausible suggestion does not solve the 
problem, we need to be clearer about exactly what Anscombe’s point is. 
Perhaps it might be best to clarify what Anscombe is and is not saying by 
attending to the exegesis offered by Moran and Stone and then to Gustafsson’s 
response to this. Each of these papers is mostly, but not completely, right, and 
the two together provide almost all the illumination that I think we need. The 
point of the present paper is to provide the rest. Moran and Stone start by 
asking why Anscombe brings up expression of intention at all in her initial 
account of three contexts in which we make use of the concept of intention. 
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Their whole paper is an answer to this question, and I will not summarize all 
of it here, but a key part of their answer is this:
with the verbal expression of intention a discontinuity with natural mani-
festation arises, and it is this that Anscombe seeks to mark. Such expressions 
introduce something new: a characterization of what one is doing—what 
larger action one’s actions are part of or toward which they are aimed. Expres-
sions of intention are thus “world-directed,” but not just in the way that 
expressions of states like belief or hope are: they make possible the applica-
tion of the notion of “mistake” to performances, and they express practical 
commitments. (Moran and Stone, 2017: 271)
Emotions such as fear or joy can be naturally manifested, and we can learn 
to say, for instance, “I am afraid” or “I am happy” to supplement or replace 
these manifestations. Expressions of intention, however, are different, because 
they involve a kind of commitment. If I said I was happy but am now sad then 
my mood has changed. I have not made a mistake. Whereas if I said that I 
intend to catch a certain train and then do not, unless my intention has 
changed, either I lied (as I might equally do about being happy) or, and this 
is the important difference, I failed to do what I intended to do. We can if we 
want call certain forms of behavior “expressions of intention”, but it is impor-
tant not to lose sight of the difference between verbal expressions of emotion 
and verbal expressions of intention. Moran and Stone put the point this way:
Rather than standing in for performances […], expressions of intention have 
a force that no bit of natural behavior could have. Specifically, they make 
contradictable claims, and they require that something else one does then be 
regarded as correct or mistaken. (Moran and Stone, 2017: 266)
Verbal expressions of intention are especially important, they argue, 
because of the importance placed by Anscombe (see Anscombe, 2000, §5) on 
the question of why an agent is behaving as they are (the question seems to 
require a verbal response); because an intentional act can be performed cor-
rectly or incorrectly, which seems to require an independent standard by which 
to judge it, and a verbal expression of intention provides such a standard; and 
because “only a verbal expression of intention can directly display the unity of 
‘intention’ as it occurs in ‘intending to X’ and ‘an intentional action’” (Moran 
and Stone, 2017: 272). 
One might wonder, given the importance of verbal expressions of intention 
as just outlined, whether non-verbal beings can have intentions. Anscombe 
clearly believes that they can, or at least that there is nothing the matter with 
ascribing intentions to them as we often do. In her paper “‘Under a Descrip-
tion’” she gives the example of a bird that lands on a twig that has been 
smeared with bird-lime in order to peck at bird-seed. Under the description 
“landing on the twig” the bird’s action was intentional, she says, but it was not 
so under the description “landing in bird-lime” (see Anscombe, 1981: 209-
210). Moran and Stone note that in such cases “we apply the descriptions 
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under which the creature’s action is intentional” (Moran and Stone, 2017: 
264). That is, the bird need not think of any such descriptions. Rather, lan-
guage-users apply them to the bird’s behavior, partly on the basis of what we 
believe to be good for the animal in question. Unfortunately, they do not 
explain fully the basis on which we apply such descriptions, and what they say 
on the subject leads them into trouble, as Gustafsson points out. I will spell 
out his objection more fully below, but begin with an example of a problem 
in what they say: “Just as the engine’s behavior indicates that the car is going 
to stop only if the car is going to stop, so the movements of the cat indicate 
only what it actually goes on to do” (Moran and Stone, 2017: note 54). How-
ever, if what the cat goes on to do is to walk into a trap, rather as the bird in 
Anscombe’s example lands in bird-lime, then its previous movements did not 
only indicate what it actually goes on to do. They indicate, if anything, some 
other intention. And this intention might be quite obvious, as when an animal 
takes the bait in a trap. 
Anscombe’s understanding of intention, as Gustafsson understands it, is 
significantly influenced by Aristotle and Aquinas (see Gustafsson, 2016: 208). 
He argues that she understands animal intention partly in terms of the ends 
proper to each species. It is doubtful, however, that Gustafsson’s Aristotelian 
reading of Anscombe is quite right. Certainly Anscombe’s work on intention 
was influenced by Aristotle as well as by Wittgenstein, as she makes clear in 
her book. But the nature of this influence does not appear to me to be as 
Gustafsson presents it. I will preface my criticism by saying that it is possible 
that Gustafsson would largely agree with my position. Much depends on 
exactly what he counts as knowledge of the ends of a species. His reference to 
Aristotle and Aquinas in this connection, however, suggests that he has in 
mind something more metaphysical or technical than the knowledge by sim-
ple observation and common sense that I will focus on. 
Gustafsson rejects the account offered by Moran and Stone of what Ans-
combe says about the bird that lands on a twig coated with bird-lime. Accord-
ing to them, when we say that the bird landed on the twig in order to peck at 
seed we want a description of the bird’s behavior that makes it intelligible, 
given what we know the bird is seeking and what it regards as good for it. This 
seems quite right, but Gustafsson disagrees:
All we get is unhelpful circularity: we are supposed to seek a description of 
what the bird did which is comprehensible within what we already know that 
the bird is seeking, whereas the problem is to give an account of how the latter 
knowledge is possible in the first place. (Gustafsson, 2016: 218. Emphasis in 
the original.)
Gustafsson’s concern is that Moran and Stone allow us to project intentions 
onto animals that they do not actually have. If we rely on Aristotelian ideas 
about what is good for members of a specific species, however, then we can 
avoid arbitrariness and be true to Anscombe’s preferred metaphysical commit-
ments. In Gustafsson’s version, then, we rely on ideas about what kind of 
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activity is good for birds of this sort whenever we attribute a certain intention 
to one of them, and:
Conversely, in saying that the bird’s behavior is unintentional under the 
description “landing on a twig with bird-lime on it,” we are presuming that 
getting stuck in bird-lime is a hindrance rather than conducive to the ful-
fillment of aims that the bird has qua a bird of its kind. (Gustafsson, 2016: 
217-218. Emphasis in the original.)
Gustafsson agrees with Moran and Stone about the normativity of intention. 
That is, “if I intend to do something, I might succeed or fail to do what I intend 
to do” (Gustafsson, 2016: 214). Where he disagrees with them is on their sug-
gestion that this normativity must be linguistic. A bird that lands on a twig 
coated with bird-lime has done something that it did not intend to do, some-
thing that may well result in its death. But it gives, and can give, no verbal 
expression to its intention according to which its behavior can be judged as 
correct or mistaken. As Gustafsson observes:
There is no reason—and Anscombe sees no reason—to argue that nonlin-
guistic, behavioral manifestations of intentions do not exhibit or convey the 
relevant standards of correctness. Her conclusion is the opposite one: since 
certain bits of natural behavior manifest intentions, those bits of behavior do 
exhibit the relevant standards of correctness. (Gustafsson, 2016: 216-217. 
Emphasis in the original.)
Gustafsson notes that Moran and Stone might be aware of a difficulty in 
their position here, since they acknowledge that we sometimes see that someone 
is making a mistake. The example they give is of someone brushing a wall with 
a paintbrush that they have forgotten to dip in paint. They also use the expres-
sion “barking up the wrong tree” to describe such actions, which suggests 
another case, namely that of a hunting dog barking as if its quarry were in a 
tree that is actually empty (Moran and Stone, 2017: 266, quoted in Gustafsson, 
2016: 217). Moran and Stone go on to say, though, that, “here it is important 
that we grasp a particular description of what they are doing or intending to 
do, one which a human being could give in answer to the question ‘why?’” 
(Moran and Stone, 2017: 266). This is correct, but the description need not 
actually be verbalized, and certainly not by the agent. If the behavior alone, 
without a verbal expression, does not make the intention involved clear then it 
seems, Gustafsson notes, arbitrary what intention is attributed to the agent in 
such a case. When the agent is human they could correct false descriptions of 
what they are up to, but if the agent in question is a dog then there is no such 
possibility. In that case, Gustafsson says, “Strictly thought through, [Moran’s 
and Stone’s] sort of view entails that animal intentionality is just a piece of 
anthropomorphic fiction” (Gustafsson, 2016: 217). 
This, it seems to me, is an excellent diagnosis of the one point on which 
Moran and Stone go wrong. But in trying to correct their view, Gustafsson 
himself errs. He writes that:
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according to Anscombe, in saying that the bird is acting with the intention to 
peck at bird-seed, we are relying on the conception that pecking at bird-seed 
is a good thing to do for birds of this sort (so it is evident that the bird in the 
example cannot be a sea-eagle, for example). (Gustafsson, 2016: 217)
Anscombe does not say this, however, and it is a problematic position to 
take. One problem with the view that Gustafsson attributes to Anscombe is 
that it seems to require us to know what kind of bird we are talking about, 
and know something about the needs and behavior of that species. But it 
might be perfectly obvious that a given bird is pecking at seed, or trying to do 
so, without one’s knowing whether it is a sea-eagle or not. It might, similarly, 
be clear that a dog is chasing a ball, even if doing so is not particularly good 
for it qua member of its species. It might even be clear that an animal is trying 
to do something that is very bad for members of its species, as when a dog 
tries to eat chocolate (which can be toxic for dogs) although it will not be 
trying to do so under a description of the act as one that is bad for the animal. 
A second problem is that in saying that a bird’s behavior is unintentional 
under the description “landing in bird-lime” one might mean either that the 
bird has no idea that any such thing as bird-lime exists, or that it is landing 
on that particular twig despite the fact that it is covered with some funny-look-
ing substance. In the first case, the bird is simply oblivious; in the second it is 
knowingly engaging in risky behavior. It is true that, if we know what bird-
lime is (i.e., an artificial product made to trap birds), we know that landing in 
bird-lime is a hindrance to the fulfillment of the aims of birds of that, or any 
other, species. But knowing is not presuming. (Gustafsson says, remember, 
that in saying that a bird’s action is unintentional under a particular descrip-
tion we are presuming that the action so described is a hindrance to the 
fulfillment of its aims.) And not every act that is unintentional under a cer-
tain description is a hindrance to the fulfillment of the agent’s aims. If I 
withdraw cash from an ATM that is both the nearest one to me and the 
second one ever installed in the city I am in, then I am probably withdrawing 
cash unintentionally under the latter description (I am oblivious) but inten-
tionally under the first. It does me no harm to use a machine with this his-
toric property, however. And something similar could go for birds and the 
twigs they land on. They intentionally land on twigs that have properties 
relevant to their goals, but under descriptions that make no reference to those 
goals, their landing there is unintentional. It need not therefore be detrimen-
tal to them in any way. (Perhaps in Anscombe’s example the bird-lime does 
not actually work, and the bird gets away unharmed.)
A third problem with what Gustafsson says about this is his insistence that 
“the problem” is to explain how we know what the bird is seeking. It is very 
tempting to say that we can see what it is seeking, in which case this problem 
would not exist. If a bird flies until it reaches a twig, then lands on it and 
moves along it until it reaches some seed, which it then pecks at, then its end, 
in the sense of both its stopping-point and its goal, was that seed or pecking 
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at that seed. But perhaps there are cases where it is not so simple. If the bird 
is a sea-eagle, say, and we know that they do not peck at seeds. So, this one 
might be unusually hungry, or brain-damaged, or trying to do something else 
entirely. To work out what is going on in a case such as this, or to know that 
it really is a sea-eagle, it might help to know some biology. Even then, we 
would still need to keep in mind that birds, like people, can be very stupid, 
and do not always behave in ways that are conducive to their well-being. If we 
want to know what a given animal is trying to do then we should, first and 
foremost, look and see. If it is chasing a ball or trying to eat chocolate, then 
catching the ball or eating the chocolate is what it intends to do, and those are 
the correct, non-arbitrary, non-projected descriptions of its behavior. We do 
not need metaphysical commitments to do this and Anscombe does not insist 
otherwise. 
Gustafsson raises the question of how we know what a bird, say, is seeking, 
and suggests that we might need to refer to knowledge of what is good and 
bad for members of its species in order to know and not simply project our 
own ideas onto its behavior. This is an understandable line of thought, but it 
does not appear to be Anscombe’s. She explains in Intention how it is that 
intentional action can be defined in terms of language and yet intention-de-
pendent concepts can be applied to animals:
The reason is precisely that we describe what they do in a manner perfectly 
characteristic of the use of intention concepts: we describe what further they 
are doing in doing something (the latter description being more immediate, 
nearer to the merely physical): the cat is stalking a bird in crouching and 
slinking along with its eye fixed on the bird and its whiskers twitching. (Ans-
combe, 2000: 86)
This is why Gustafsson rightly says that Anscombe rejects talk of the cat’s 
behavior expressing its intention. Its movements are its stalking the bird, and its 
stalking the bird involves or includes the intention to catch it. That it is stalking 
the bird, rather than, say, merely walking near it, means that the cat is trying to 
catch the bird. Describing the action as stalking tells us what the cat intends. 
How, though, do we know that this is the right description to use? Anscombe 
answers this with reference not to thinking about what is good and bad for 
cats but to looking:
Just as we naturally say ‘The cat thinks there is a mouse coming’, so we also nat-
urally ask: Why is the cat crouching and slinking like that? and give the answer: 
It’s stalking that bird; see, its eye is fixed on it. We do this, though the cat can 
utter no thoughts, and cannot give expression to any knowledge of its own 
action, or to any intentions either. (Anscombe, 2000: 86-87) 
We also do this without any reference to special knowledge of what is 
conducive or harmful to the flourishing of cats.
Gustafsson argues that Anscombe equally regards intention in animals and 
in human beings as cases of intention but of different kinds of intention. 
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Human intention is connected with language in a way that animal intention 
is not. Unlike human intention, “the cat’s intention to catch the bird exists 
only qua the cat’s stalking” (Gustafsson, 2016: 225). This is what makes it like 
the car that is about to stop. The car has no intention, so it is also important-
ly different from the cat, but the symptoms of its being about to stop are not 
really separable from the fact that it is about to stop. Or at least, not as sepa-
rable as a human being’s intention to do something is from the expression of 
that intention, which might, after all, be a lie. Unlike cats, human beings are 
also quite capable of acting against their biological interests. We sometimes 
do things because they are bad for us, when one wants to commit suicide, for 
instance, as Anscombe notes (see Anscombe, 2005: 116). 
According to Gustafsson:
In the cat case, as conceived by Anscombe, the cat’s intention (to catch the 
bird) is constitutively bound up with the cat’s nonconventional behavior (its 
stalking the bird), and this constitutive nexus is intelligible in view of what 
sort of creature a cat is. The characterization of the behavior qua directed at 
an intended goal— “stalking the bird”—is applicable because cats are crea-
tures for which it is good to catch birds and because they have the biological 
equipment (sense organs, etc.) needed to aim at particular things (like birds). 
If [I am] correct, the reason why Anscombe does not want to call the cat’s 
behavior an expression of the cat’s intention is that the constitutive interrela-
tionship between intention and behavior is too tight to make the notion of 
“expression” applicable. (Gustafsson, 2016: 226)
This is different from Moran and Stone’s view that expression of intention 
needs to be verbal because only a verbal expression can provide a criterion of 
correct execution. Behavior does not express intention, according to Ans-
combe, because the connection between behavior and intention is too tight, 
to use Gustafsson’s word. What I do to achieve my intended goal embodies my 
intention in a way that cannot lie (see Gustafsson, 2016: 231). I might walk 
down a certain street in order to make you think I am going to a museum, say, 
but then this walking embodies my intention to deceive you. It is not merely 
a deceptive act regarding my unreal intention to go to the museum. It is also a 
real act that shows, unavoidably if unwittingly, my intention to deceive.
Might we not, even so, choose to say that actions embodying a certain 
intention express that intention? Gustafsson’s view is that Anscombe means to 
stipulate that we ought not to speak this way when doing philosophy, because 
of the danger of our doing so leading us astray in a Cartesian or empiricist way 
that treats intentions as mental states that are not very different from sensations 
such as pain (see Gustafsson, 2016: 235). This is precisely the kind of danger 
that Wittgenstein was concerned about avoiding. Gustafsson also notes that in 
colloquial use we only call something an expression of X if it is distinct from X 
itself (see Gustafsson, 2016: 224). A cat’s stalking a bird, which consists of its 
walking towards it in a certain way, is not appropriately distinct from its inten-
tion to catch the bird, however, since without this intention these movements 
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would not amount to stalking. I can form an intention but not act on it yet, 
and, if I change my mind, I might never act on it. But we cannot seriously 
attribute this kind of intention to an animal. It makes no sense to ascribe an 
intention to an animal whose behavior reveals nothing of the intention in 
question. Unlike human beings, animals cannot reveal their intentions through 
language, so apparently intentional behavior is the only criterion for the ascrip-
tion of intentions to them.
However, I am not certain that Gustafsson is quite right about Anscombe’s 
desire to distinguish non-linguistic animal intention from human intention. 
In her paper “Under a Description,” which Gustafsson discusses, she address-
es the following question:
Animals that have no language can have intentions too: how then, it is asked, 
can it be right to say that an intention is always ‘under a description’? (Ans-
combe, 1981: 209) 
To answer this question she brings up the example of the bird that did want 
to land on a certain twig, but did not want to land in bird-lime. So in doing 
both it did what it wanted under one description, but not under another. 
Anscombe now asks another question, and answers it right away: 
If it landed on the twig in order to peck at the bird-seed, can’t we say it took 
landing on the twig to be a way of getting into a position to peck at the bird-
seed? We can, if we say that a bird thinks it can escape into the open by flying 
towards the daylight that comes through a glass barrier. (Anscombe, 1981: 
209) 
On the one hand, this way of talking seems perfectly normal. On the other, 
it might seem to require the bird to be thinking to itself, perhaps in its own lan-
guage, something along the lines of, “Landing on this twig will be a way for me 
to get into position to peck at that bird-seed.” Anscombe denies this, however: 
This way of talking [i.e., the way exemplified in the passage quoted above] does 
not presuppose that the bird has any thoughts about descriptions. If there is 
a difficulty, it concerns ascribing those other thoughts to the bird; it is about 
passing from the bird’s intentions or aims, to the ascription of belief to it. But 
someone who says the bird’s action was intentional (or voluntary) under one 
description, not under the other, need not enter into that dispute at all. “It 
took landing on the twig to be a way of… but not a way of…” is merely a 
rather roundabout way of saying that, e.g., the bird meant (wanted) to land on 
the twig, but not to land on the bird-lime. Landing on the twig was landing 
on bird-lime – we aren’t considering two different landings. So, if we form 
definite descriptions, “the action (then) of landing on the twig”, “the action 
(then) of landing on a twig with bird-lime on it”, we must say they are definite 
descriptions satisfied by the same occurrence, which was something that the 
bird did, but under the one description it was intentional, under the other 
unintentional. That the bird is not a language-user has no bearing on this. 
(Anscombe, 1981: 209-210) 
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Anscombe’s response to the objection, where she says both (1) that animals 
have intentions but lack language and (2) that intention is always under a 
description, says nothing about animal intention being different from human 
intention. Instead she says that the bird’s not being a language-user is irrele-
vant. The objection, she says in a part of the passage above that I omitted, 
supposes that her claim about intentions being under a description implies 
that a description “is in some sense written into something inside the agent.” 
But the implication is that Anscombe denies any such thing. So human inten-
tion and animal intention do not appear to be two different things. At least, 
this seems to be a misleading way of speaking. The difference is that humans, 
having language, can express their intentions while animals, whose intentions 
may well nevertheless be visible, cannot. 
Anscombe accuses Wittgenstein not so much of doing something bad but 
of choosing words that are likely to mislead. This might seem a somewhat 
minor criticism, especially given both that Wittgenstein refers to natural 
expression of intention only once and that there is no known case of anyone 
having been misled by this use of words. Nevertheless, her criticism of Witt-
genstein is of interest beyond the question of whether Wittgenstein was right 
or wrong. Coming to understand her criticism, which we can perhaps best do 
with help from both Moran and Stone and from Gustafsson, helps us see what 
is, and is not, involved in expressions of intention, and why this matters. As 
Moran and Stone make clear, an agent can fail to do what they intend to do, 
which makes intention different from emotion and belief. A sincerely verbal-
ized intention thus provides a criterion by which future action can be judged. 
As Gustafsson points out, however, ascriptions of intention to animals by 
humans will be arbitrary unless there is some basis in the animal’s behavior for 
such ascription. Moran and Stone assert, problematically, that, “Considered 
apart from their verbal expressability, intentions are sunk in facticity. […] 
[T]he movements of the cat indicate only what it actually goes on to do” 
(Moran and Stone, 2017: note 54). This fails to account for the kind of 
mistake we see when a dog barks up the wrong tree or a bird lands on a twig 
coated with lime. To avoid this mistake, Gustafsson posits that Anscombe 
relies on our knowledge of what is good or bad for members of various spe-
cies. But this seems to complicate matters unnecessarily, and is not what 
Anscombe actually says. What she says, and what seems right, is that at least 
sometimes we can simply see what an animal is trying to do. In this way, 
Gustafsson, having perceived the flaw in Moran and Stone’s account, takes 
a wrong turn himself. Going back to what Anscombe says helps to reveal a 
simpler solution to the problem. For what it is worth, she also appears to be 
right to criticize Wittgenstein on this point. Talk of a natural expression of 
intention is potentially misleading, making it harder to see the subtleties 
brought out by Anscombe and the commentators on her work that I have 
discussed in this paper. 
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